On 4 November 2026, two unrelated reports landed on the same day.
In the morning, Debian, Ubuntu and the developers of APT, the program that installs software on both systems, published fixes for a flaw that let an attacker on the network swap a package after it had passed its signature check . The attacker's code then ran as root.
A few hours later, the French security firm Sekoia described a campaign it links to the Russian group APT29. For one week, a small web analytics script loaded by thousands of websites quietly added a second script that profiled every visitor's phone and served it an exploit chain to match.
One story is about servers, the other about websites. They teach the same lesson: most of the code that runs on your machines and in your visitors' browsers was written by someone else, and the checks we rely on cover less than we think.
A package, checked and then replaced
Debian and Ubuntu do not trust the mirror a package comes from.…