First published on tt-tech.io .
A colleague's GitHub account may have pushed a secret stealer into your repository this week, run it once, and removed it a few minutes later. If it ran, every secret and cloud role your workflows can reach is in someone else's hands, and the run log that would tell you is gone.
Aikido Security, which first reported the campaign, counts 4,837 compromised accounts that opened test pull requests in 61,764 repositories, starting on 10 November. The payload ran in at least 1,806 of them, by their count. SafeDep found 8,093 repositories that received malicious commits between 10 November, 12:46 UTC, and 12 November, 04:36 UTC, and the campaign was still active when that search ran.
Why your usual defences did not see it
This is not a pull request from a stranger's fork. The commits are authored as real users of the repository, with their noreply email and no signature, which points to stolen tokens. In 1,343 repositories the author was not the owner but a collaborator or a bot.…