Day 1 after a sole IT admin leaves is an access problem. Every account that can change, delete, or read company data needs a name next to it, and any password the leaver knew has to change, since nobody can say for sure who else has it.
The failure mode
In a 2024 advisory, CISA and MS-ISAC described a state government breach that began with a former employee's administrator account, one that wasn't disabled right after the person left. The attacker likely got the password from a separate data breach, and neither admin account they used had multifactor sign-in turned on. Nobody had to target that agency. A dormant admin login just had to be sitting there.
Disabled is not signed out
Disabling an account isn't the same as ending its sessions. Microsoft's default is that Entra ID access tokens live for 1 hour. Apps that run their own session cookies can keep a person signed in even longer.…