Abstract. I built two agent systems guarded by pattern matching: a tool-using support agent behind a regex-style injection detector, and a SQL agent behind a validate-then-approve gate. I tested how those layers hold against systematically mutated attacks, and what the defence costs in false refusals and lost completion. I mutated my seeds deterministically (147 agent-guardrail cases; 84 SQL attacks, 13 benign controls), added an indirect-injection scenario suite, and scored three metrics: attack success rate (ASR), false-refusal rate (FRR), and completion under attack. Surface-form mutations were blocked almost perfectly; encoded payloads (base64, ROT13, leetspeak, zero-width, homoglyphs) collapsed the pattern layer β 0 of 24 runs blocked per class. The SQL gate stopped 83 of 84 attacks (database never modified) but misclassified a comment-glued write inside a CTE and falsely blocked 2 of 13 benign queries.β¦