When someone hands their phone to a friend to show a photo, the last thing they want is that friend casually opening their personal finance app and browsing their account balances or net worth.
Mobile authentication is the front door of personal privacy.
Yet many Android apps implement authentication with alarming vulnerabilities:
Storing a plaintext 4-digit PIN in unencrypted SharedPreferences .
Using weak, unsalted MD5 or SHA-256 hashes vulnerable to instant precomputed rainbow table attacks (a 4-digit numeric PIN has only 10,000 possible combinations, which a modern smartphone CPU can crack in less than 2 milliseconds).
Using vulnerable string comparison methods ( pin == inputPin ) susceptible to CPU execution side-channel timing attacks.
Here is how FinLedger architected its authentication subsystem during Hardening Sprint H8, combining hardware-backed Android BiometricPrompt with 50,000-iteration salted PBKDF2 PIN hashing and constant-time verification.
The Problem With 4-Digit PINs
A 4-digit…