Here is a request body I keep finding in agent logs. Nothing exotic — a stack trace, a config dump, a database URL with the password still attached:
{ "role" : "user" , "content" : "Why does this fail? postgres://app:[email protected]:5432/prod — timeout after 30s" }
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Every file in that repo passed review. The leak did not come from a file. It came from a field — one string inside a payload that nobody classified. So the invariant I want to enforce is narrow and testable: no outbound string containing a credential-shaped value leaves the machine, even when the file it came from is allowed to leave.
Can a gate do that without turning your context into useless mush?
The trust boundaries I actually care about
When you point an agent at a free model tier and a free server, four boundaries matter more than the marketing page:
Repo → agent. Untrusted content (READMEs, dependency docs, issue text) becomes instructions.
Agent → request body.…