SCRAM channel binding fails when clients silently downgrade
PostgreSQL's SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS authentication binds the password exchange to the TLS tunnel. When channel binding is enabled and enforced, a client and server can detect that an attacker has substituted the TLS connection on which the authentication exchange occurs. A recent PostgreSQL JDBC security release describes CVE-2026-54291: a driver configured with channelBinding=require could silently downgrade from SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS to plain SCRAM-SHA-256. The connection might continue while the client believes the stronger guarantee is active.
That gap is important because the problem is not the SCRAM algorithm by itself. It is the mismatch between a required security policy and the client's behavior. Version 42.7.12 of the JDBC driver contains the correction.
Check policy and observation separately
PostgreSQL documents channel binding as a protection against a man-in-the-middle substituting a different TLS connection.…