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GPU Sandboxes for AI Agents (2026): Isolation Options, GPU Sharing Risks, and How to Give Untrusted Code a GPU Safely
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GPU Sandboxes for AI Agents (2026): Isolation Options, GPU Sharing Risks, and How to Give Untrusted Code a GPU Safely

DEV Community: security·Noah Grinstein·about 11 hours ago
#hojZIfZQ
#devtosecurity#devto#dev#nvidia#gpus
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To give untrusted agent code a GPU safely, you need a boundary that still holds with the GPU driver exposed. Today that means gVisor with nvproxy or a VM with GPU passthrough, plus a whole GPU per sandbox (or a MIG instance behind a VM with vGPU), a patched driver, and locked-down egress. On Control Plane, the agent can run in a Control Plane Sandbox while GPU steps run as separate workloads built from a reviewed image, so agent-generated code does not run on the GPU. Those workloads can attach NVIDIA GPUs, get drivers installed and updated by Control Plane on its managed regions, and start with no credentials and outbound traffic blocked.

Disclosure: Control Plane publishes this guide.

TL;DR

GPU isolation is harder than CPU isolation because every sandbox has to reach the NVIDIA kernel driver, and the NVIDIA Container Toolkit that wires GPUs into containers has had critical escape CVEs.

gVisor with nvproxy and VM passthrough through Cloud Hypervisor or QEMU with VFIO are the two boundaries that work…

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