How Many of a Scanner's Findings Are Real? Web-Vuln-Scanner's Detection Pipeline and False-Positive Control, Measured
1. Problem and background
A vulnerability scanner's report has a question that rarely gets asked to its face: how many of these findings are real?
The cost of a false positive is not "a second look." One fake high-severity SQL injection drags the on-call engineer through a full incident loop — confirm, reproduce, read the code — until it turns out the page merely mentioned database errors in its prose. Enough false positives and nobody reads the report carefully anymore; the real findings get swept away with the noise. In a detection pipeline, false-positive control is not polish. It is what decides whether the report deserves trust.
My own open-source project, Web-Vuln-Scanner, is a small ethics-first scanner: it refuses to run without an explicit target and an explicit authorization confirmation.…