Prompt injection doesn't break your agent. It talks to it — in the agent's own voice, through text nobody but the agent will ever read.
This is the condensation. The full deep-dive lives on intothe.tech (this post is canonicalized to it), and it's part of a series: the anatomy of a SKILL.md and why MCP configs are payloads .
The con, in one sentence
A language model has no reliable boundary between instructions and data . Your system prompt, the user's request, a fetched web page, a tool description — all of it arrives as text in the same channel, and the model has to guess which words are commands. Attackers don't need to break anything. They just need to write.
The name is borrowed from SQL injection, and the borrowing is precise. SQLi wasn't fixed by asking developers to be careful — it was fixed by parameterized queries, a structural change.…