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Stop the action, not the injection
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Stop the action, not the injection

DEV Community: rust·Cleiton Augusto Correa Bezerra·about 2 hours ago
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2026 has a pattern. A single email takes over a cloud agent and reaches its Gmail token ( Salt Labs' "Manus" research ). A single prompt to an AWS Bedrock AgentCore agent reaches the instance metadata service and pulls over-permissioned cloud credentials — and AWS called it "expected behavior" ( Zenity, CVE-2026-18830 ). Microsoft 365 Copilot leaks data through indirect prompt injection again and again — Reprompt, ShareLeak, SearchLeak, CoSnitch — and in one reported case the data left even though the safety layer flagged the attack .

Different products, one failure: an agent acting with broad, inherited authority, and nothing enforcing the limit at the moment of the action. Google measured a 32% rise in malicious prompt injections in a single quarter; the Cloud Security Alliance says indirect injection has crossed from proof-of-concept to live exploitation ; Anthropic says no browser agent is immune.

So stop trying to win the injection fight. You won't.…

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